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SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
 
 Appellant SIU de Puerto Rico, a union that is the 
exclusive representative of certain employees of the Virgin 
Islands Port Authority (VIPA), appeals from the district court's 
dismissal of its claim against VIPA to enforce an arbitration 
settlement awarding payment for accumulated sick leave to 
retiring employees represented by SIU.  This court has 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 I. 
 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 On December 23, 1987, SIU and VIPA entered into a 
collective bargaining agreement (Agreement), effective from 
October 1, 1987 to September 30, 1990.  The Agreement specified 
that "[a]ll sick leave in excess of 90 days shall be paid in lump 
sum as compensation" to retiring employees at their rate of pay.  
App. at 16.  Sometime after signing the Agreement, VIPA stopped 
paying retirees for accumulated sick leave, claiming that the 
sick leave provision of the Agreement violated Virgin Islands 
law.  SIU filed a grievance against VIPA and submitted it to 
arbitration.  SIU and VIPA then settled, agreeing that VIPA would 
comply with the sick leave provision.  The arbitrator approved 
the agreement on September 18, 1991. 
 However, VIPA continued to refuse to pay for 




district court to enforce the arbitration settlement.  The 
district court denied VIPA's motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, and SIU moved for summary judgment.  
In response, VIPA argued that at the time the Agreement was in 
place it lacked statutory authority to pay for accumulated sick 
leave and that the inclusion of the sick leave provision was 
inadvertent.  VIPA also claimed that it had entered into the 
stipulated settlement only because of an "abrupt change in 
personnel."  App. at 84.  The district court denied summary 
judgment for SIU and dismissed its claim with prejudice because 
it found that VIPA lacked legal authority to pay for accumulated 




 Although VIPA has not filed a brief with this court and 
thus has not renewed its argument that the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction, we must assure ourselves of 
jurisdiction. 
 The district court asserted subject matter jurisdiction 
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 
29 U.S.C. § 185, which confers jurisdiction on federal courts to 




violations of collective bargaining agreements.
1
  VIPA had argued 
that section 301 did not confer jurisdiction on the district 
court because VIPA's dispute with SIU concerned a violation of an 
individual employment contract, not a violation of the collective 
bargaining agreement.
2
  In Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 
195 (1962), the Supreme Court said, "The concept that all suits 
to vindicate individual employee rights arising from a collective 
bargaining agreement should be excluded from the coverage of 
section 301 . . . has not survived."  Id. at 200.  It follows 
that the district court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 185. 
 VIPA also argued without merit that SIU lacked standing 
to vindicate the rights of an individual employee.  We agree with 
the district court that unions have standing to vindicate 
individual employee rights under a collective bargaining 
agreement negotiated by the union.  See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal 
Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 699-700 (1966). 
 B. 
 On the merits, SIU argues that the district court erred 
in holding that VIPA lacked statutory authority to pay for 
                     
1
.  The district court of the Virgin Islands exercises the same 
jurisdiction as a district court of the United States.  See 48 
U.S.C. § 1612(a); 4 V.I.C. § 32. 
2
.  VIPA relied on Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955), a case the 
Supreme Court later declared had been undermined by subsequent 
cases and was "no longer authoritative as a precedent." Smith v. 




accumulated sick leave.  Our standard of review on this question 
of law is plenary.  Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 
F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 VIPA is an instrumentality of the Virgin Islands 
government, 29 V.I.C. § 541(e), a characterization that by 
express statute applies for purposes of public employee labor 
relations.  24 V.I.C. § 362(i).  In 1986, the Virgin Islands 
legislature eliminated the authority of public employers 
participating in the Employees Retirement System of the Virgin 
Islands (ERSVI) to pay retirees for accumulated sick leave.  See 
3 V.I.C. § 731(a).
3
  Because section 731(a) authorized VIPA only 
to credit accumulated sick leave to a retiree's retirement 
annuity as of 1987, the date of the Agreement, the district court 
was correct in holding that VIPA acted beyond the scope of its 
                     
3
.  Section 731(a) provides:  
 
 Any member [of ERSVI] having accumulated and unused 
sick leave at date of retirement shall be entitled to 
service credit towards the service retirement annuity 
to which the member may be entitled.  The credit for 
accumulated and unused sick leave shall be 1 month for 
any period of 14 to 26 days inclusive of such leave and 
½ month for any period of 5 to 13 days inclusive.  Less 
than 5 days of such unused sick leave shall not be 











authority in agreeing to pay accumulated sick leave "in lump sum 
as compensation" to retirees. 
 It is "well-settled law" that neither the United States 
nor the Virgin Islands government is bound by a contract entered 
into by an agency acting beyond the scope of its authority.  In 
re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 831 F.2d 1221, 1229 (3d Cir. 1987); 
accord Heyl & Patterson Int'l, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Hous. of Virgin 
Islands, Inc., 663 F.2d 419, 428-29 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 1018 (1981); In re Hooper's Estate, 359 F.2d 569, 577 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 903 (1966).  It follows that 
VIPA acted beyond the scope of its authority in agreeing to pay 
accumulated sick leave to retirees, and the sick leave provision 
of the Agreement is void ab initio and cannot be enforced.  See 
Smith v. Department of Educ., 942 F.2d 199, 201-02 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(where agent of Virgin Islands government failed to execute 
agreement in compliance with applicable statutes, "no valid 
contract was ever created"); Heyl & Patterson, 663 F.2d at 432 
(agreement by government that did not meet statutory requirements 
"null and void ab initio"); Hooper's Estate, 359 F.2d at 577 (no 
contract existed when agents of Virgin Islands government acted 
beyond scope of authority in granting tax subsidy). 
 Nor is VIPA estopped from claiming that the sick leave 
provision of the Agreement exceeded its authority.  The 
government cannot be estopped from denying the validity of an 




opposed to mere omission or negligent failure."  United States v. 
Pepperman, 976 F.2d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 1992).  Cf. Office of 
Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 421 (1990) 
("[S]ome type of 'affirmative misconduct' might give rise to 
estoppel against the Government.").  In its response to SIU's 
motion for summary judgment, VIPA claimed that it "inadvertently 
permitted" the inclusion of the invalid sick leave provision in 
the Agreement and that it stipulated to the arbitration 
settlement only because of "an abrupt change of personnel."  App. 
at 84.  SIU produced no evidence of affirmative misconduct.  In 
the absence of any such showing, VIPA is not estopped from 
denying the validity of the sick leave provision of the 
Agreement. 
 SIU argues that for the purposes of negotiating the 
Agreement VIPA was not an agent of the Virgin Islands government.  
However, VIPA's enabling statute specifically provides that all 
VIPA employees "shall be covered by and subject to the Employees 
Retirement System of the Virgin Islands."  29 V.I.C. § 573(a).  
Though VIPA is a semi-autonomous public corporation with "legal 
existence and personality separate and apart from the 
Government,"  id. § 541(e), it must be considered an agent of the 
Virgin Islands government when it bargains with its employees. 
 This court reached the same conclusion twenty years ago 
in a case between the same parties.  See Virgin Islands Port 




I).  SIU went on strike against VIPA after its collective 
bargaining agreement with VIPA expired.  The district court 
enjoined the strike because Virgin Islands law prohibited strikes 
by public employees.  On appeal, SIU argued that VIPA was 
effectively a private employer for the purpose of bargaining with 
its employees.  This court disagreed, holding that VIPA is 
"expressly made a government instrumentality," id. at 453, and 
that nothing placed VIPA's employees on a "different footing from 
other government employees."  Id. at 454.  SIU then argued that 
the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, which 
prohibited strikes, implicitly authorized SIU's strike.  Again, 
this court disagreed, concluding that even if the parties 
intended that expiration would create a right to strike, such an 
agreement would be unenforceable because Virgin Islands law 
prohibited strikes by public employees.  Id. at 455.  VIPA I 
therefore stands for the dual propositions that VIPA is an agent 
of the Virgin Islands government in bargaining with its employees 
and that VIPA cannot contract with its employees beyond the scope 
of its authority.  Specifically, VIPA cannot confer a benefit on 
its employees that Virgin Islands law prohibits, and any attempt 
to do so is void ab initio. 
 We do not condone VIPA's actions in its dealings with 
its union and its employees.
4
  As the district court recognized, 
                     
4
.  Indeed, VIPA has demonstrated the same nonchalance in dealing 
with the arbitrator, failing to appear at a scheduled 




SIU presents a "sympathetic" case.  App. at 90.  However, the 
employees' rights to enforce their contract with VIPA is a matter 
which lies in the hands of the Virgin Islands legislature. 
 III. 
 CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court dismissing SIU's claim.   
(..continued) 
in this court to defend its position and the district court's 
order. 
 
 
 
 
